How do we build a truly resilient security framework directly incorporating micro segmentation into the SCADA systems and our network in order to protect it, when we can’t add security controls for fear of the business consequences?
I think the solution is quite obvious on the surface: change the dynamic that has existed within our communication-centric IT world since the inception of ARPANET. What do I mean?
In this blog post we will cover the basics of building a truly resilient network where throughput isn’t always important, but reliability and redundancy are. We will look at this from the operators’ stand point.
I’m back with another exciting installment on SCADA security. Today I want to cover authentication and System redundancy.
It should be obvious, but authentication takes on an even more important role in securing SCADA environments. If you can’t protect the traffic coming in, you should at least ensure that the traffic is coming from a trusted source. This is one of the most emphasized points in the U.S. governments’ SCADA compliance (we see different countries having similar requirements for the SCADA/PCD environments throughout the world). I’m also glad to say that this is one part of compliance that most customers comply with because it’s easy and there is no business risk. You can send out a token and presto! Two-factor authentication is in place. That’s what the law requires and that’s what most companies that need to comply do. Yes, I was very specific in my wording. They send out one token to each of their component manufacturers set up one shared account for each of their equipment suppliers. In other words, they comply but completely miss the point.
Hey folks, I’m back with my second installment on protecting the un-protectable:
Last week we discussed the SCADA environment and some of the unique business and technology challenges we face when trying to secure it both from availability and cyber security hazards. The questions you are all asking yourself now are “how did we get here?” “Why would anyone build anything this insecure?” The answer is so simple … we never anticipated these networks would communicate with the outside world. PCD and SCADA environments were meant to be “closed loop” and therefore air-gapped (If you’re air gapped, you don’t need security, right? Ask Iran about the Natanz nuclear facility). If you think about it, that was a perfectly good assumption. Why would factory machinery ever need to access the internet, or a power plant, or an oil rig… I could go on and on. However, this paradigm changed for two reasons.
In today’s world when most of us think about IT infrastructure, we think about the traditional environments that have firewalls, switches, routers, standard operating systems and all the associated security. We think of internet applications like Facebook, LinkedIn, eBay, SalesForce and Amazon, etc.
What we don’t think of is the SCADA environment; Networks and systems that are embedded into all our critical infrastructure, transportation systems, power plants, water treatment facilities, all factories, mining, oil production, etc. Most of us just assume these networks are like all other IT environments, that they face the same risks and deal with that risk in the same way. I’m here to tell those of you who think that way, that they don’t and they can’t. There are technical reasons why they can’t and business reasons why they won’t. They are, to some extent, the un-protectable networks.
